intensity did and liberated, let us see ourselves and equal and it stands up a very well actually. >> we invited her for this and unfortunately we were not able to get -- >> if you can get her, she is terrific. ..

have you ever, ever, sat on a goods grade or line, if they're honest, they'll have to say yes. pause -- because we all steal. what's wrong with it? shakespeare, to come back to my point, was, early on in his career was attacked. he'd pinched a lot of good phrases from other people. so i think it's a noble tradition. and so long as it doesn't take the place of thought and imagination, there's no harm in decorating your nest with things that are bright and shiny and come from somewhere else. >> host: booktv is in london, we've been talking with robert mccrum. he's the author of several books, his most recent globish. you can also read him at "the observer." thank you for being on booktv. >> guest: thank you very much.

>> for more information on these and other interviews from london, visit booktv.org and watch booktv every sunday at 6 p.m. over the next several weeks for more. >> you're watching book tv on c-span2. and here's a look at our prime time lineup for tonight. coming up next, brian michael jenkins talks about his book, "when armies divide." then at 8:30, anat ahmadia to talk about "the banker's new clothes." on "after words," lawrence legaller discusses his book, the price of justice. at 10 p.m., conrad black takes a look at the emergence of the united states as a world power. and we conclude our programming at 10:45 with i didn't think -- ying ma. that all starts next on c-span2

ice booktv. >> the rand corporation's brian michael jenkins takes a look now at the problem of securing nuclear weapons during times of rebellion, war and political run upheaval. that's next on booktv, it's about an hour, 15 minutes. [inaudible conversations] >> then you can describe what you do, it's a bit humiliating, but thank you for that introduction, alan. we have, actually, been at this, as many of you know, for some time now, although this is, we're using the occasion of your, the launch of your book, brian, to really have a bit of a coming-out party in terms of announcing this expanded initiative, an array of activities. a lot of the work that we have done in the past, as some of you in the room i hope are aware, really has been focused as alan mentioned on the issue of wmd and non-proliferation issues. but -- and, indeed, this will be

the focus of the discussion we have today. but just maybe to set it into a little bit broader context, we are now at a point where we are trying to take some of the issues we have learned over the course of the past six or seven years to expand into other areas, be it the trafficking in conventional weapons, human trafficking, drug trafficking and an array of other transnational issues that we believe really do share some common elements, the most obvious being, of course, it's bad stuff moving across borders. and it's our con tension that -- contention that we have as governments, as private industry, even as international organizations and even private individuals which are becoming increasingly important on the international scene, obviously, we've erected these artificial barriers to how we address these various challenges. so whether it is working a bureau that works on human trafficking that does not communicate with the bureau that's working on drug trafficking which does not communicate with the bureau

that's working on wmd proliferation issues, within a government, between governments and certainly between governments and private industry it's really that nexus of issues and capacities that we hope to really draw together and begin to break down those artificial barriers to the extent that we can see across them even if we can't eliminate them entirely. but, brian, i'm extremely pleased, obviously, to welcome you here to the stimson center not only so you can share in our party, but for a number of reasons. certainly, i enjoyed reading your book which i should mention to everyone in the room is available on amazon.com, and i highly recommend you rush back after the event to your offices and purchase a copy. but there are other reasons as well. i think to be topical, obviously, the issue of non-proliferation, of nuclear proliferation and certainly

nuclear terrorism, brian, really never leaves the headlines. it's always there as a subtext although it pops up and down over time. but i think in light of the relatively significant budget cuts that the president has announced in his 2014 budget to the suite of non-proliferation programs that the u.s. government is leveraging to address this problem, it is certainly a topical issue. certainly questions over the safety and security of the command and control of the stocks of chemical weapons in syria that alan mentioned makes this book, i think, and this subject today a topical one. the real reason i think the overarching reason that i'm so pleased to have you here at stimson is that because in this, in this sea of hyperventilation here in washington that is certainly not unique, i think, to the field of terrorism, but we've certainly cornered the market on it. to some extent and perfected it.

brian jenkins really has been through it throughout his career a cool head and an impassioned observer and an academic on this issue working closely with government and others in the ngo community. and i've benefited for many years, brian, from your good work, and so it's a pleasure to welcome you here to launch this book. i think you'll agree that the nuclear non-proliferation narrative today really revolves around the potential threat posed by a nuclear-armed terrorist. so, obviously, the question of iran, of other countries that potentially could be seeking to develop a nuclear weapon remains in the news. but it really, this nuclear terrorism issue is the one that has been described by now-successive presidents as the greatest threat that our country faces. and i know that you have some very strong feelings on that, which i'd like to get into. but suffice to say i think by the end of the cold war, the industry that grew up around

nuclear terrorism really became, in many ways, a self-licking ice cream cone, a self-propagating industry in and of itself that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks really became for many in government and for many of us outside of government almost a national obsession. to date, there have been since the end of the cold war and certainly since 9/11 billions of dollars have been expended by the u.s. government across a broad array of agencies, the department of defense, the department of energy, the state department to control and get our arms around a whole suite of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological threats that we are told are out there, and i think that you describe both in this booking as well as in -- book as well as in previous books. as a result of those programs, though, we've had remarkable successes. thousands of russian warheads have been destroyed, thousands of weapons scientists have been engaged, tons of chemical agents, biological agents and

pathogens have been eliminated, foreign borders have been secured and so on and so forth, obviously, promoting not only u.s. national security, but international security as well. but even still i think official washington continues despite those successes to display a grave concern over the probability of a wmd incident, and particularly one involving, involving terrorist acquisition of a nuclear, chemical or a biological weapon. so just before coming on stage here i just quickly racked my brain for a -- wracked my brain for a few examples of the prognostication, so let me list a couple of them. in 2001, a commission led by howard baker and lloyd cutler that you will recall, brian, stated that well: the most urgent unmet national security threat to the united states is terrorist acquisition of a weapon and insecured stockpiles of nuclear materials. in 2002 warren buffett, in a letter stated -- the oracle of

omaha -- quote: if the chance of a weapon of mass destruction being used in a given year is 10%, for those of you who are mathematicians here, follow this closely, and the same probability exists for 50 years, the probability of an event happening at least once during those 50 years is 99.5%. in 2008 the graham-that'll lent commission stated there is a better than even chance of a weapon of mass destruction incident involving terrorists occurring somewhere in the world before the end of 2013. a better than even chance before the end of 2013. and in 2011 the then-assistant director of the fbi stated that the notion of probabilities in this field are really moot, because there is a 100% probability that a terrorist will use a weapon of mass destruction. so as i look back on this, brian, and as i survey the

record of washington in predicting a wmd incident, it's clear to me that we ain't very good at predicting when a wmd terrorist incident will occur. and it got me thinking a little bit more deeply, a lot of our work really has crossed this divide between the role of private industry and the role of governments in addressing these big transnational challenges including the challenge of wmd proliferation. and when insurance companies assess the probability of an incident -- any incident -- it is for them a very serious and certainly a very precise business, because it means the difference between profit and loss for the company. and so whether it's an earthquake, whether it's a hurricane, a tornado, a fire or my driving habits, they have developed very sophisticated models to predict future incidents based upon historical track records. so, of course, as we talk to the insurance industry on this particular issue, underwriting a

wmd terrorist event whose implications are extremely significant and could run into the hundreds of billions of dollars, um, it's a very different and a very serious business, clearly. the question for them that they posed to us is how do you predict what is, essentially, an unpredictable event? and one in which there is a, essentially, no -- or, rather, very few hard precedents. the insurance industry, i know, struggles mightily with this question even if, i think, we here in washington are occasionally rather loose with our own, with our own predictions. and that is what i think makes your book that you have released such a useful exercise. it really begins to paint, you know, an admittedly scant historical record of incidents that could ultimately lead to these unconventional incidents

of proliferation, really focusing, i think, as much on the demand side as it does, as it does on the supply side. and looking at various pathways to terrorist acquisition of a weapon. so i commend you for that. so that is my rationale for you writing the book. so maybe we can hear from you in terms of what your rationale was for this, for this particular piece of scholarship. >> where well, you know, you mentioned -- by the way, we're both named brian, so we're going to call each other brian -- >> as often as possible. >> -- as many times as possible. [laughter] you mentioned the concerns about syria's chemical arsenal right now given the civil war in that country. reportedly, according to some recent headlines and i'll stay with reportedly, the united states has plans to secure pakistan's nuclear arsenal against threat. there was recently a game at the pentagon, an exercise at the pentagon to explore how the

united states might secure nuclear weapons in north korea should that country's government implode, and this raises a number of questions about what would we really do, what would we really face in these situations where a country with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction face a coup, a revolt, a civil war, disintegration of the state itself. and that was great concern. now, henry -- [inaudible] had recently a conference on this and looked at a number of cases at his mpec center and looked at cases in pakistan, having coups in pakistan since they acquired nuclear weapons. there's certainly been political upheavals in china, and most dramatically the fall of the

soviet union. and all of those in a sense are good news. they're good news in the sense that armies are conservative, obedient organizations, and even when they seize power from a civilian government or the state ceases to exist in its current form such as the collapse of the soviet union, the army chain of command stays intact. soldiers follow orders, the weapons are secured. but then that raises the question what happens if the army divides? what happens when armies divide, when there's, when the commanders split? when loyalties of those who are in charge of nuclear arsenals or

other arsenals with weapons of mass destruction can no longer be guaranteed? and at that point we can say that that security exists my longer. now, fortunately, we don't have a rich history of that, but we do have, we do have one event which turned out all right. but one event which is fascinating, and it's also a terrific story anyway. and that is in 1961 france was testing nuclear weapons at its test site in the sahara. now, this was an unusual circumstance to begin with because at the same time the french army in algeria where the test site was was engaged in a bloody war with the fln fighting for algerian independence. there was already growing

tensions between the french military and the government led by charles de gaulle in paris. remember that the french army overthrew the fourth french republic in 1958. that led to the return of de gaulle with the expectation that de gaulle would keep algeria french. whatever his initial attitudes, by 1961 president de gaulle had concluded that this would, this would consign france to an endless, costly colonial war. and rather than be a colonial nation bogged down in algeria, that algeria could gain its independence as far as he was concerned, and france could move on to become a great power by developing nuclear weapons. this did not sit well with the

army. so we move forward to april 1961. during the preparations for the fourth nuclear test, the french generals in algeria revolted against the french government. and their plan was to take over all of algeria, destroy the algerian rebel forces and present france with a french algeria. this was only three days before a scheduled nuclear test. and we know now according to some good historical work done by a french scholar that there had been a phone call made by the commander of the french rebels in algiers to the general commanding the test site in the sahara in which the commander of the rebellious general said do

not detonate the small bomb. keep it for us. it may come in handy. and at this point then we have the set in motion the dramatic story. now, with the retelling of this story over the period of years by various historians, the story gets better and better, and subsequent historical accounts we have the weapon being detonated just as rebel troops are closing in on the test site, which was not true. we have the weapon being -- it's not really a weapon, it's a test device -- being scuttled in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of the rebels. the test took place. actually, it turned out that not as many commanders and units went with the rebellion as the commanders hoped, and instead of having any plan or making any effort to acquire the device, they spent the next two days before the revolt finally collapsed on the third day

attempting to persuade officers who were sitting on the fence to join in the rebellion. so the test came off, albeit with disappointing, with disappointing results for largely technical reasons. so the incident was this terrific story, but what was to me more interesting in it is all of the issues that arose that the government had to deal with would arise in future circumstances whether we're talking about an event on the korean peninsula or an event in pakistan or in some future nuclear-armed state or in a syria where we face these kinds of questions now. all of these questions would arise. first of all, a fast-moving event. everything took place within a 72-hour period. second, i mean, complete unpredictability. not only did the government in

paris not know what was going to happen and was in a state of panic, the commanders of the rebellious forces and the loyal forces in algeria didn't know what was going to happen next. because at that point it came down -- and this is the next observation -- it was a matter of every individual commander making personal calculations about which way they would go. in this revolt. and if one looks at some of these circumstances that we worry about, again, that could, that could arise. not only was their ability to know the outcome limited, but this was completely beyond the capacity of any outsiders to know what was going on. so not that there was any notion

of intervening, but i managed to get at least -- i don't believe that i have the full account, but i have a fairly good selection of cia cables sent from paris and algeria at this time that have been declassified in the last half century, and we didn't know what was going on at the time. we knew there was a nuclear test about to take place. any type of intervention would have been fraught with risk. uncertain about individual loyaltyies, a varied set of actors, rebels, loyal forces and is on. and so it struck me that this was instructive not for the good historical story, but that it really highlighted a lot of the decisions that we would face or any government would face in

responding to an incident like this in the future. >> so, brian, let me go back to a couple of points that you made. what sort of evidence have you managed to turn up in terms of the decision making both in paris and at the site among the military commanders? which you did get to. was there that is instructive for how we might project forward into future incidents in which we see this breakdown in command and control? >> what was fascinating in paris is that the political leadership was basically in a state of paralysis, did not know what to do. the only elements that were functioning were the directors of the security services, and internship still functioning -- they were still functioning and, in fact, they were making some

key arrests of some general commanders of garrisons in both france and in germany whose loyalty was suspect. but they themselves as heads of the security services were suspected of disloyalty by the group surrounding de gaulle himself. in other words, within the government itself it wasn't simply that people knew that algeria was in revolt, the generals in algeria, but if the army was in revolt, why should we trust the heads of these is services? they might be, they might be part of this. and so a tremendous amount of mistrust had spread throughout. turns out that in paris all of the good military equipment was in algeria. france rolled out some old world

war ii sherman tanks that actually were, that the police had. and they used to break up demonstrations. not to fire at anybody, just to clang through the streets. they had no ammunition, they surrounded the buildings. the minister of the interior came up with the brilliant idea of handing out weapons to civilians in case paratroopers from algeria would land in paris. this was considered by the directors of the security services to be a very bad idea, and they reversed that and tried to get the weapons back. so a great deal of mistrust. and, in fact, the other interesting thing was while no one saw the nuclear device in algeria as likely to be used either on the rebel side or on the government side, it wasn't that they were going to take this nuclear device and drop a nuclear device on paris. as i say, it was a test device

anyway. it didn't have that capacity. but possession would -- in this uncertain atmosphere -- possession would have had enormous psychological importance. in other words, would the rebels be able to claim we have the nuclear device even if they could do nothing with it? that could have been a psychological tipping point in terms of bringing down the government. on the other hand, on the rebel side, well, they had absolutely no intentions of attacking paris. the fact is there were, there were some in the rebel command that were not satisfied with the degree of ruthlessness. and when they became frustrated that the army units were not joining the revolt, their

proposed solution was we have to get tough. whereas the leader of the revolt himself wanted to do everything he possibly could to avoid soldiers shooting at soldiers. want to avoid bloodshed. so there was a lot of bluff and maneuver and units going back and forth. but heaven forbid, no one opens fire here because then we're in, then we're in a civil war. but some of them weren't satisfied with that and said, no, we've got to take the wraps off. which would have been especially a problem since most of the units with the revolt were the elite units, the paratroopers, and the foreign legion. most of whose soldiers were german. and so to have german engineers shooting at french soldiers would have created a hell of a problem. on the other hand, in paris one

of the ministers proposed that the only solution was to bomb algeria. so the idea of having french air force planes come over and bomb the french army in algeria. what was interesting is, fortunately, the revolt just simply collapsed. it was an improvised affair, and it didn't go very, very far. but had this continued for day can -- for days more, for a period of time, one can see very quickly how -- i mean, there's a french term for this. in english we just say the grinding of the gears. [speaking french] it has a different connotation in france. that is, you begin to grind into this, and you do this, and they do that, and you can see very, very quickly where things can descend into fighting, bombing one another. and at that point there's a

great deal of uncertainty about whether these weapons will be used. and i think, you know, relevant to the current situation if we look at syria right now, i mean, we've -- our is secretary of defense and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff have already said there is not a lot we can do to prevent the use of chemical weapons in syria. we can warn of consequences, we can try to respond, but can we actually move in and prevent them? the answer is, no. and so we have now these uncertain circumstances where it appears that -- although there's uncertainty -- chemical weapons may have been used. have been used upon orders from the central leadership in the government, from the top? did assad order their use? worse, are they dispersed among

military units and now it's down to individual commanders making decisions about this? or if the rebels have used them, as there are some reports, even worse because it says now they're out of the hands of an organized force, and can they may be, they may be dispersed through the country. now, that works for chemical weapons. fortunately, in nuclear weapons one will know if thai used or not. but back to the french case, suppose that the rebels did get their hands on it. didn't use it, but the device simply disappeared. ..

that have not been recovered, then that lends credibility to every future threat to buy a group, and i think that really, fundamentally changes things going toward. it. >> so then let's stick with the syria example, and let me draw you on that last point. the debate, as you know, on both sides of pennsylvania avenue state.

indeed, internationally, do we intervene militarily in syria? in light of the current circumstances. obviously it's a very different situation. perhaps even more complex, but the question in my mind is -- and you referenced and also recognizing that the and since you are describing in your book occurred over 72 hours. syria has not. it's an extended amount of time that we're trying to manage situation. but referencing the cia cables and other foreign correspondents that you seem in the process of your research, what was the debate? was there much debate at the time in terms of foreign intervention? what did not look like? and is there any comparison between the debate then and what you would posit the debate today to apply? >> at that time, there was no notion of foreign intervention.

as i say, the external powers knew that the test was taking place. they obviously knew that their vote was taken place. the united states, keep in mind, the timing here. their revolt in algeria took place one week after the bay of pigs. so the u.s. government, washington was a bit preoccupied with other things on its mind. the u.s. position was, it did not -- did not think that a french nuclear program was a good idea, and we would not support it. we would not interfere with it, and things happened so fast, as they say, there was no notion of intervening, although -- and this is -- this point could become an issue in the future. there were deep suspicions on

the part of some in france that the united states was, in fact, behind the revolt and that this was some sort of an effort, potentially, to sabotage the french nuclear program. one of the reasons that the french testing was an irritant to the united states and others had written about this is that at this time there was an international effort to halt to atmospheric testing. and there was a moratorium on atmospheric testing, which the french were not go along with. the soviets became suspicious that, in fact, the u.s. was behind the french testing and ordered to basically provide cover for the u.s. to test. in that think the broader lesson that we draw out of that is,

number one, and future circumstances, we may not be the only actors in these -- in these episodes. there may be other intervenors. there will be suspicions on the part of everyone else about everyone else's intentions. and the final thing i'll say about that is, our efforts to manage this situation, and a sense, that is very much a washington approach that we somehow can manage this situation when we are talking about situations that, you know, -- the notion that win all of the mechanisms in place to guarantee security to provide all of the predictability that we want in these circumstances a broken-down, that we can still

manage this situation is, in a sense, a very american notion. final point -- final point. a real concern in circumstances like this, if any country goes to intervene and in the course of the intervention the weapons are either used or accidentally used or chemical weapons disburse in the course of an attempt to take them over or somebody in the last ditch effort says, well, instead of giving them up we're going to blow them up or something like that, does the intervening force that is attempting to secure them then bear the liability for the consequences of their use?

back to a your insurance examples. were we to go and to secure nuclear weapons in the country, or intervene in a country to, let's say hypothetically prevent the development of nuclear weapons and there are nuclear explosions or the dispersal of nuclear material. do we bear a liability for those consequences? >> so, you -- we have spoken briefly about syria. you reference also in the book that there are other historic things, historical examples of this command they are all in perfect, but at least then maybe as effective. the collapse of the soviet union, the cultural revolution in china, the coup d'etat in pakistan, and at the front end of the discussion, in each of those cases we ended up with a

good news story, the command control and the professionalism of the military maintained strict control over these weapons. in syria we may be in an environment where we have a different story. we don't know yet. but let's try to project a little bit more and push you into other geographic regions, thinking specifically of returning to pakistan coronary have done some thinking, but also pressing maybe even a little bit further and walk us through what you believe, having examined this particular incident in algeria in some detail, what of the lessons learned that we might be able to apply to those contexts? should we get to a point in either of those countries down the road where we see a

breakdown in central authority, are we going to be more likely to see a post-soviet novel or are we more likely is the something more -- something potentially more dangerous? >> i am a former soldier in the infantry. answer is always it depends on the situation in the terrain. these are -- each one of these episodes are highly individual and will depend upon the nature of the precise scenario. i suppose, and looking at the specific circumstances in this episode and algeria and looking into some of the hypothetical scenarios for something like pakistan or north korea or some future nuclear weapons state, it is sobering in the sense that the first lesson to draw from misses, this is a perilous

venture that is outside intervention in the circumstances. it's a long shot at the best, and i'm not saying therefore we should never consider it. therefore action may not be necessary, but one should not have any degree of optimism that we can do this. this is more complicated, it's more complicated than, for example, going after a single man. i know we have, and justifiably so, great pride in our abilities to carry out the spectacular and successful special operations, but, you know, in the case of algeria there was one device. in the case of pakistan, for example, we are talking about a potential nuclear arsenal of about 100 devices in different places plus weapons production

facilities and so on. so this really gets complicated. and the notion that we're going to be operating in a benign environment is also nonsense. so these are long shots, desperate at the end. if we add that desperate at the end then, of course, that brings back a powerful argument for non-proliferation efforts, that is, if you cannot follow the problem that might occur, you probably want to do everything you can to prevent people from going down that path. what is interesting about u.s. policy is sometimes i think that we exaggerates the threat of nuclear terrorism and make claims that some of the state's will readily provide nuclear weapons to terrorists, which i think is less likely.

i just cannot see that as a likely scenario, buddies used as an argument against proliferation, and certainly against proliferation, but we say, well, why are we against proliferation? because they will give it to terrorists, and terrorists will probably use it. if you look at the history of terrorism, yes, there is state sponsorship of terrorism. yes, there are efforts to maintain deniability. but nations, as opposed to individual bombers are really suicidal. nations do not like to give very precious, powerful weapons. they might better consequence of the use to entities that might not be under their control or might be penetrated by adversary intelligence. and so i just don't see that as a likely scenario.

on the other hand, looking ahead , i mean, if we were to have further proliferation in the middle east, the goal for something, and a nuclear iranian are saudi arabian state, all of these have been discussed, and we look at the -- and we look at what is happening in the air of spring, libya, syria, so on, that itself is a scary scenario, and it is not -- it is not to invent this terrorist bogyman as an argument against proliferation. it is to say, we are really dealing with circumstances that very quickly can go out of control, and there is not a lot that can be done about it. now, there also may be -- there may be an element here where the engine national community gets together and things not --

thinks not only about the non-proliferation efforts, but does think more seriously about what we would do as an international community in these types of circumstances. i mean, i know we have a pot lines and we try to think about things. during the cold war actually, before the collapse of the soviet union there were great concerns that if somebody were to get on top of either one of our nuclear devices or one of their nuclear devices, of rogue either military commander or terrorist or someone else, how would the two superpowers communicate with each other to keep this from turning into world war three? and it may be -- it may be appropriate to start revisiting some of those things in what would be a more complex situation. is it realistic to think that we

can -- or a weapon goes missing or the situation like that to my can we actually quarantine, effectively pointed nation? doubtful. in terms of intelligence, can we rapidly mobilize a swarm of sensors and other things to try to quickly locate and track -- i'm talking about an all-out push. all of these are issues raised. i don't have the technical knowledge myself to say whether it is possible, but those certainly could be explored. i think exercise is like the one that reportedly took place at the pentagon, what if anything could we do? and if the answer is not a lot, then that's a conclusion. let's not have any illusions about what we can do. so, again, back to this case.

well, the algerian case worked out okay. i don't think the device was scuttled. i don't think there's any great danger. nonetheless, it is so destructive in terms of raising these other complications. >> our audience is here. almost always seal was wallflowers' on it. nothing to say and said quietly, but i suspect there may be a questionnaire to that has arisen out of your comments. and so i wonder if i could just as the couple of things before we go. one, unless your name is brian you can't ask a question. no, i'm kidding. [laughter] one, if you would come away for the microphone, which is the most important thing. secondly, if when you ask your question, if you could preferably in the form of a question and also state your name and affiliation for brian benefit. so we will start right here.

where going to go back to that corner. >> would like to stand up? >> please. >> i am a professor. strategic and nuclear studies. johns hopkins. it's very interesting. i enjoyed your talk, your question and answer session. i think we are talking about the facts, they have had a very highly professional army. the nuclear and strategic plans division are the professional and confidential. such that any plans that are made would be very difficult because we do not divulge that have permission to everybody. barely anybody in the army even

knows where everything is. so that is contained in a very small community. secondly, the question, i think every state has a right to make contingencies and plans for any potential threat in the future. you would not exist if you did not plan for the future. a thing might occur, and that is within the environment. i have been working a lot on counter-terrorism. suraya understand that. anderson the feelings. they're is a lot, the media produces the type of industry which makes people very nervous. unfortunately you have the media that really propagates. this isn't. having said that demand this is where the question comes, what if there was a situation like

this in the estate's and china or russia were making plans to that effect? gumi, this is hypothetical. hypothetical games here. what about that situation? how would you deal with that or how would they deal with that? because that could be the case. >> it is a fair question. and within it, of course, there -- i know what you are raising is a question. what is it that gives the united states in the acis the right of being the first responder, the self appointed first responder to a nuclear security emergency around the world. and the answer is, there is nothing and can indeed come in the book and mention why we would think that we would be the only first responder, the only ones concerned or even the only

legitimate responders in that. as to what would occur here in the united states, the fact is that historically, is startling the united states has worried about this issue. the development of permissive action, which is technology it we have shared with a number of countries, concepts including pakistan is based upon the premise that we do not want some rogue commander to initiate, to be able to initiate the use of nuclear weapons by himself. and so we have created a very elaborate structure, which we, as i say, offer as a model to

ensure that a chain of, you know -- that this cannot happen. now, i think it is remote, but it would surprise me if somewhere in the archives of the kremlin there aren't some contingency plans for addressing , you know, similar scenarios in the ad states. the differences, i think, however, as well we are talking about -- we're talking about nations now that are in a state of active civil war, active conflicts going on, and while -- whenever i come to washington i am reminded of the active conflicts going on in this city. faxed to my regularly fly back to california convinced that the

terrorists are any number two. nonetheless, we are not in the shooting wars your. if you go out to warren buffett's 50 years, you know, look, forecasts -- i think people can make reasonable forecasts of the next year to come by accepting the likelihood that there will be surprises. maybe they can get out to five years. beyond that we are in the entertainment industry. and so i would not say what could happen in the future. if china and russia had contingency plans for dealing with a civil war breakdown in the united states, it would not bother me. i would be curious to they are. [laughter] >> the federation of american scientists.

let me ask you about another possible example. if you find anything unusual about the october 271966 chinese test, which you recall, was the firing and launching of a ds to missile, 12-kiloton atmospheric detonation. i should add, simply tell me about this incident his business it was to know about these things. and that what actually happened was rogue elements of the second medullary sees the missile and fired it. now, i have not been able to corroborate this. one ph.d. dissertation by someone i know the road it. i have not checked yet. i was wondering if you ever came across anything like this. of course, this is quite timely

for may be rogue elements of the north korean military firing a missile and the crisis situation. >> i mean, it sounds a tantalizing. i honestly, personally do not know enough about that particular episode. i mean, that is done to have to be the subject of a future book. in henry is in the audience. this was discussed. >> and it was published. >> but, i was not the author of that paper. i thought it was a fascinating paper, but i don't know the details. >> we would get to you. >> use written about this. >> published. on our website. been there for your. >> all right. >> take a look. >> i'm happy to, by the way --

i'm happy to say as much when i know things and happy to say when i also don't know enough to go down a path where would get myself in deep trouble. other question. henry. [laughter] >> it was not. maybe. sort of. he had a lot of detail and there. when you're at the conference, we discussed that. think it was the result of that presentation and brno's that helps generate your interest in writing this book. so by the way, i think you ought to be commended in bringing us back to all time religion. worry u.s. states again, not just men. let me ask you a question. we and friends of mine have tried to interest the pentagon in doing analyses of what it

would take to intervene. could not get anywhere. i have played in classified games. terrible, terrible, ridiculous consequences when they play this out. it is pretty clear that we're not into reading, at least in the games i played in. do you have any sense of how much planning areas and how much contacting mib in this regard? because if, as i suspect, based upon the analyses that i as commissioned, it is as grim as you say to may not to bring us back told time, since your concerns about non-proliferation instead of worrying about all of the chain-link fences and locks and things. me to, perhaps, focus a bit more back to the old stuff. >> i'm just curious. >> i agree with that. by the weight, it was primarily

the very rich discussion between bruno and myself on the algerian case. brno is a french scholar that has looked at this, it brought about and compel me to look more deeply into this algerian episode. and one historical point here, i was benefited enormously from the fact that a fellow who was at rand in the 1950's named constantine melnick left rand in 58 to go back to become the coordinator of french intelligence for algeria in the gaulle's government, prime minister raise office and was there at the time of the events i write about and, in fact,

constantine is in paris today writing his memoirs and was kind enough not only to share many details about the discussions that went on in the cabinet and the intelligence coming from a algeria, but was even tiny gnat because i was so fascinated by it that historical essay in the book itself talking about these events. i mean, this is the man that was at the center in the government in paris talking about it at the time. but while i completely share the idea that we should be looking at proliferation and the old-fashioned way, i honestly do not know the extent of contracting either by department of defense or the intelligence

community, the magnitude of contacting going on. >> use sometimes work at grand? >> i do, and i will give my answer again. i do not know the extent of u.s. government contracting in this area. how expensive it is and exactly what they're looking at. i mentioned the games involving north korea and what the u.s. might do. there was grand -- not personally, but there was rant participation in that, no bits and pieces, but not enough to be able to tell you the size of the forced. i don't have privy to every ounce of information.

>> all on one second here. i'm sorry. all on one second. there is a second microphone that actually has to make its way to you. go ahead. >> sandy specter with the moderator center for nonproliferation studies. first of all, thank you for the new information about this terrific case. it is just -- i am sure there is much more in the book because the turmoil in paris at the time was really pretty extraordinary. wonder if there is not another set of cases that predates nuclear weapons that might be relevant. there are some episodes in which the ultimate weapon of the time, which i think that dreadnoughts more or less changed hands, so one episode is after the fall of france some of the french navies in north africa eventually the british left to a jacket. i don't know enough about the russian revolution to know what happens to that set of assets.

obviously they at the. some went over to the rebels, some state with the royal forces, i imagine. and then it may be worth identifying these kinds of instances and adding a little bit to the background of the episodes of the current era. so i would like ted make that comment. >> that's fascinating. and there may be something that will give us additional, you know, some additional clues here and some additional case studies to take a look at. one of the things that i have always been fascinated by, and this brings us back to the new clear around, i don't believe that there was ever a nuclear black market that was made. people talk about the nuclear black market. and the quantity that end up are relatively tiny quantities, and

most cases. and the buyers turn out to be sting operations, and it is a fascinating area, but it is not a black market like the market with drugs or something on the market really is made and there is transfers. nonetheless, in the area of red mercury, which is the hopes of since the mother of substance that was believed would contribute to enable people to have a short cut path to the fabrication of bit their weapons. now, red mercury did not exist. these were stamps. but the people who were buying did not know that. and so what i wanted to do was to go back into the area of,

okay, what was the population of buyers? what were the terms of the deals? what were their expectations? in some cases we know that from nuclear -- you know, aspiring states such as saddam hussein was a victim of the red mercury hoax. we know that certain terrorist groups were probably the victims of a red mercury hoax. but if we really put together all of this material, not to explore whether or not it really provides an easy way of fabricating nuclear-weapons, but rather look at it from the point of the expectations of the buyers and what that tells us about those who might become potential purchasers in the

future. i think -- and this is an idea i want to explore further. thus far the amount of nuclear weapons has been through, and a sense to my replication of the manhattan project. that is, one requires the skills , one acquires the capacity to enrich uranium, to make fissile material. one requires the design knowledge, although that may be purchased or provided by another state, but that is a fairly traditional. if we get into a proliferation environment where a number of nations want to have a shortcut to nuclear-weapons that do not have that technological base, the scientific base, but have ample funds, can this be

acquired through unconventional means? in other words, can we see proliferation's have nuclear weapons states without the precursor of a proliferation of manhattan projects through outsourcing, through -- through, and a sense among black markets, although 1-stoplight markets. unconventional paths to state proliferation, to me, is a more worrisome thing then building a nuclear bomb in a garage which is an unlikely scenario call. [inaudible question] >> if we could return briefly to the pakistan scenario.

if you my walk us through your thoughts about given with the united states wants the intervention, what could pakistan be doing now to think through what it could do if a new, nuclear material get loose and, you know, how could it comfortably turn to other nations for assistance? things that we should be thinking of now? the possible reduction. >> i don't -- it is a good question, and certainly, i cannot speak for the government of pakistan. but given as was pointed out by one of the previous speakers in terms of asking a question and the comments made that the knowledge of the deployments and

circumstances of nuclear-weapons and pakistan is limited to a very few people which provides certainly advantages in some cases. it is also an obvious security measure against foreign intelligence, it also can make things difficult and -- during turbulent time france is people simply aren't going to know where everything is. but the fact that that information is held within a close circle, the fact that we know that there are certain features of the storage of nuclear weapons indicates that that government of pakistan, the strategic command-and-control of these weapons pays close attention to this issue of security.

and so it is not as if they're not thinking about the security of nuclear-weapons just as we think about our new clear weapons, and they have taken a number of measures to guarantee that security. and so we know that. and there is a measure of cooperation already between the united states and pakistan. that does not mean an believe for one minute that they are sharing everything with us or that we are sharing everything with them, nor would one expect that to be the case, but there is a measure of cooperation. at the same time, the weapons have to be not only protected in terms of their security, but the

reason pakistan has nuclear weapons is for potential use. i mean, however unimaginable one may think that is, that's why you have weapons. and therefore, there have to be certain conditions of being able to move these weapons, bring components of these weapons together. under certain times in which pakistan feels threatened. and so the objective of having nuclear weapons is not simply to secure nuclear weapons. is to be able to deploy nuclear weapons. and that, in turn, always becomes, you know, resting session compromises of security. the other concern in pakistan is that we have seen, despite the efforts, not at the nuclear

sites, but we have seen attacks by extremist elements on military facilities, naval bases , another facility, these were sizable -- these were sizable assaults by determined units that appear, at least, to offer evidence of some internal assistance. now, you don't know whether that -- is that a sergeant, is that, you know, when extremist in the ranks? that i don't know. but that is a concern. there are further concerns, and i am not picking on pakistan here, but that is a reality, it's a country that is involved in a major arms struggle

internally with the taliban. there are bombings, a tax constantly. it has had only its first transfer of power from a civilian government to civilian government, and so when we look at the conflict beyond -- the ongoing conflict and we look at some of the radicalization, it raises concerns. not only in the united states, islamabad. and so this is it -- this is, for them -- for us this may be a theoretical game in the pentagon for pakistan it is not a theoretical game. these are real life issues. >> if you could handle this, we will take one more question. here at the back. >> thank you. good to see you.

retiree from office. i want to follow-up with your comments. most of the discussions but nuclear-weapons and proliferation seem to center around devices delivered by aircraft or missiles, you know, missile sites, but one would like to take on the threat or the possibility of the so-called dirty bonds because this is where i think some of the red mercury buyers were looking. for terrorism, a van packed with some kind of a dirty device will suit the purposes much as something conventional perry d.c. as a danger? and what is your take on the efforts? >> i think in terms of various scenarios involving the dispersal of radioactive material, we are talking really about a weapon of terror rather

than a meaningful threat of mass casualties. unless one has massive quantities of radioactive material and can spew out radioactive material as, you know, the burning reactor state at chernobyl, the idea of contaminating a city is not realistic. but she don't have to. you don't have to. i think terrorists work and the round of a modest amount of violence, although that can send pretty high in some circumstances, but a massive amount of terror. so, one can imagine a scenario in which radioactive material is dispersed. casualties would primarily be the casualties caused by the explosion, if it was an

explosive device, but we would have the perception of contamination. detectors would sound the alarm, and that would create an atmosphere of fear and alarm, which is what terrorism is all about. so if we think of likely weapons of terrorism, then the dispersals an aerial is the one that is more feasible and the one that has a great deal of attractiveness to it, even though it is not the one that is going to cause that thousands or hundreds of thousands or millions of casualties that people talk about. keep in mind, in terms of back to where we started our discussion, the united states has exaggerated notions about this. as i said in my previous book of

world terrorists, there is a difference between nuclear terrorism and nuclear chair. nuclear terrorism is the frightening possibility that terrorists might actually acquire a nuclear capability and use it. nuclear terror is our apprehension of the events. the history of nuclear terrorism , fortunately, is there has not been any at. nuclear terror is deeply embedded in our society and our fictional literature. everything from james bond to jack power. i mean, we have fictionally blown up more american cities with nuclear devices. it is -- it is -- and i say, part of our culture.

and that becomes a problem that we deal with in terms of the nuclear terror environment because we are dealing not with the reality of an event but, really, the reality of our fears about this. character to -- characteristic optimism, we are a nation of saskatoon. i mean, we worry about our place in the world. we worry about being overrun by other countries, by other cultures. we worry about our power. we worry about our economy going down. this is a nation of deep anxiety

end in that sense than nuclear terror almost becomes kind of a condenser for society's broader anxiety. and it enables -- it enables terrorists with communication skills to become a virtual nuclear powers. i mean, i was fascinated by the fact that in addition to your list of quotes at the beginning there about our predictions, we had in 2008, and a public speech by the director of the central intelligence agency say that the agency's number one nuclear concern in the world. north korea, nuclear weapons. a bunch of people have nuclear weapons. how did it they ascend to number

one in this? and this is really a reflection, in many cases of our own. they became too skillful communication -- there were treated as if there were a virtual nuclear power. and in the analytical community, in the analytical community the burden of proof shifted from not looking for the evidence that they were or could be, but to try to come up with the evidence that they could not possibly be. and that shift, i think, was really brought about primarily by september 11th because that simply -- it shifted our notion a possibility fundamentally. if that could happen, what could not happen? but for the analysts said meant that we had to prove that

terrorists cannot acquire a clear weapons, and there is no way we can do that. if we take a 50-year timeframe, i mean, then it is really an impossibility. and if you are inclined toward expectations of jim or doom has political utility, if it serves agendas or if it confirms personal beliefs of and times then it is -- it really affects us all the more. and so it is as much about our environment and perception as it is about what terrorist to. >> you can read more about brian jenkins reserved attitude toward the subject in this book. again, it is available on amazon both in hard copy end for dress like myself, but also on your e-reader. so i really do commend the book to you. i also just want to highlight

that this is actually the first. we are double teaming you. this is the first in a couple of events similar to this that we planned house. on may 33 will be hosting christian carol who you may know is the editor of foreign policy magazine and will be talking about his new book which would set the crossroads of religion and the modern global economy which happened in 1979. i don't want to spoil the ending, but it happened in 1979. it's a wonderful book, and so i hope he will consider coming back to john s. before that, please join me in thanking bryan. [applause] >> is there a nonfiction author of books you would like to see featured? send us an e-mail. or tweet us.

>> even though gettysburg was the midpoint and more people died after that before, white is a still looms so large a national memory? consider the statistics. three days of fighting, july 1st of through the third. 1863. 7,000 killed. 33,000 wounded, some of whom later died. and 11,000 missing. a staggering total of 50,000 casualties in 13 day time frame. >> live all they coverage from the gettysburg national military park next sunday starting in 930 eastern on american history tv on c-span three. >> beneficiary. i had -- if i did not know

better i would think ahead metastatic prostate cancer, cancer of the bone. i saw the best surgeon and get a wonderful procedure. by the way, to seven weeks ago. if somebody has hiv or hepatitis c, you need the right medications. somebody fractures about, you probably need as lange and a good orthopedics surgeon. so the madison does amazing things, and we should not forget that. someone needs a liver transplant. at a patients required 100 units of blood and survived a liver transplant in two years later ran the boston marathon. so integrated medicine has a

role in preventive medicine. how do we prevent obesity? have we prevent depression? can we cure somebody's wheezing? there is, in my mind, a certain limit to it. and we will disagree. so it has a role. i have actually experienced. arthroscopic knee surgery. i actually canceled was going to do that weekend which was pretty depressing. a spring day in boston. and then i made a friend. mentioned from your back pain. acupuncturist, and i went and saw that lady. really hurting.

she get out a card in the parking lot and character foot into the air. see a good it feels. so the next day around 4:00 i call the acupuncturist early in the morning. i went to see your. she did the acupuncture. i got up. one to the other. i could not believe it. i don't understand how it happened. calls are on the cellphone into is going to come home. i was doing some shopping. went to the kutcher club. the play nine holes of golf. so i benefited from acupuncture and things of that sort. [laughter] >> i benefited from what i practice.

never been hospitalized i agree with much of what was said. i want to answer your question. u.s. to very specific question about enumeration. now, the medical school which is legal standards. many other places like that. but there are some statistics. some statistics. we can look them up. added not make these up. between 36 to 40 percent of patients suffer from arthur genet disease which means disease that is been a result of medical treatment. 80 percent of pharmaceuticals are of marginal benefit which means if you don't use them it would not make that big a difference except some side effects and some. next time you watch television look at the commercial for any

pharmaceutical. its starts that it can give you sexual impotence, it could cause death. [laughter] in between is the total panorama also, the worst common heart surgery is coronary artery bypass. unstable angina does not prolong life in more than 2% to people, but as the most common procedure. the second most common procedure for the art is angioplasty. does not prolong life or stabilized for more than 3 percent of people. these are alarming statistics, and yet these procedures are being done everywhere. back surgery, 98 percent is useless. hysterectomy, 95 percent is useless. so we are talking about huge amounts of money they spend on procedures.

my father, our father would make a diagnosis, neurological diagnosis with position. today if you have an editing error the emergency room and if you don't walk go with a cat scan or mri you're lucky because nobody has the time to do it. so we have a crisis. what we call health reform is not health reform, it is insurance reform. as nothing to do with self. the expenditure is in the life care. no one is allowed to die in the house. i am not going to die in a hospital. i'm not trying to have any of these resuscitated procedures. i have been in community hospitals where it the same standards don't apply, and bessie doctors electing something called hyperkalemia, which is a little -- not minor, but in aberration in electrolytes which if you don't

correct will cause cardiac arrest and the patient will die. so but a lot of what we call ligation of survival is actually elongation of suffering. the only people who make many other medical providers. so this has been a huge problem. i have discussed it with politicians. i even brought it up to our presidents. but we have a system -- [applause] we have a system -- [applause] we have a system, and this, again, nothing to do with the gold standard. we have a system where for every congressman there are 28 lobbyists in washington. okay. in their only business, either medical industrial lobbyists or military industry. so, you know, where do we think our country makes money?

supplying arms to pakistan, afghanistan, india? go to dubai. the trade. so we have huge problems when the incentive for treatment becomes money and it becomes the corrupting influence. if you do a baker was going to tell you? how the think they make money? every chemotherapy treatment that they give. am i saying you should not have? there be? and not. i'm saying question. i ask everyone here to be a difficult patient. question doctors. get the statistics. go online and get the information. you well know more than the average medical provider. [applause] >> you can watch this and other programs online at booktv.org.

>> next on book tv, stanford university professor anat admati said down with book tv to discuss her book "the banker's new clothes." the book takes a critical look at the banking industry and argues that the system can be made safer without adversely affecting the public. this 30-minute interview as part of book tv college series. ..